

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0118

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 2, 1975

(SALT TWO-588)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON  
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 2, 1975.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

APRIL 2, 1975

MR. MINISTER,

I

ON MARCH 5 I PRESENTED THE US DRAFT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE  
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. SINCE THAT TIME,  
I HAVE BEEN SETTING FORTH AN EXPOSITION OF THAT DRAFT, INCLUDING  
THE CONSIDERATIONS UPON WHICH ITS PROVISIONS ARE FORMULATED.  
THOSE CONSIDERATIONS, AS I HAVE EXPLAINED EARLIER, TAKE INTO

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ACCOUNT THE NEED TO FORMULATE THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT IN

A CLEAR AND PRECISE MANNER WITH A GOAL OF MAKING THE AGREEMENT A SELF-CONTAINED DOCUMENT.

RECOGNIZING THAT WORKING GROUPS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN ADDRESSING THE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH DEVELOPING A JOINT DRAFT, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REEMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF ACHIEVING A PRECISE AND INTEGRATED AGREEMENT WHICH DOES NOT NEED APPENDED STATEMENTS OR REFERENCES TO OTHER DOCUMENTS TO MAKE ITS MEANING CLEAR. AGREEMENT ON THIS WOULD GUIDE OUR DELEGATIONS IN THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD DEVELOPING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE JOINT DRAFT TEXT.

## II

IN FORMULATING THE NEW AGREEMENT WE SHOULD DRAW UPON THE EXPERIENCE WE HAVE HAD IN DEVELOPING THE TWO PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS. IN EFFECT, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CONSISTED SOLELY OF A FREEZE FOR A FIVE YEAR PERIOD ON TWO STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ACCORDINGLY, THE TWO SIDES COULD ACCEPT A DEGREE OF IMPRECISION IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR A BROADER AGREEMENT OF LONGER DURATION WHICH INCLUDES QUALITATIVE AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS. THE ABM TREATY ADDRESSES MORE COMPLEX LIMITATIONS AND DEALS WITH THEIR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. A GREATER DEGREE OF PRECISION WAS THEREFORE REQUIRED IN ITS FORMULATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ABM TREATY, AT ITS OUTSET, NAMES THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED, DEFINES THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED, AND SPECIFIES WHEN, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR LIFE CYCLE, THOSE SYSTEMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THE TREATY. THE INCORPORATION OF THESE POINTS IN THE BODY OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING, BY BOTH PARTIES, OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN. THE AGREEMENT WE ARE NOW ENGAGED IN DEVELOPING WILL BE BROADER AND MORE COMPLEX IN CHARACTER THAN EITHER THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OR THE ABM TREATY. THEREFORE, THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRECISION AND CLARITY IS CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED.

MR. MINISTER, AS I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, REQUIREMENTS FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAVE ARISEN IN THE RELATIVELY SHORT TIME SINCE IT WAS SIGNED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS ARE  
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LIMITED BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BUT THERE IS NO CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE MISSILES ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE LAUNCHERS. THUS, A REQUIREMENT FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE SLBM LAUNCHER LIMITATION AROSE. THIS RESULTED FIRST IN THE CLARIFICATION TO THE PROTOCOL AND, LATER, IN THE DEFINITION BY THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION OF A "MODERN SLBM". THUS, TO UNDERSTAND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AS THEY APPLY TO SLBM LAUNCHERS, ONE MUST TRACE A COMPLEX PATH WHICH BEGINS

WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND ITS PROTOCOL, GOES THROUGH THE JULY 1972 CLARIFICATION, AND FINALLY ENDS WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE SCC PROCEDURES OF JULY 1974. I BELIEVE THAT THIS ONE EXAMPLE ALONE AMPLY DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR THE NEW AGREEMENT TO BE A SELF-CONTAINED DOCUMENT WHICH IS CLEAR, PRECISE, AND UNAMBIGUOUS. THIS OBJECTIVE CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INCORPORATING THE NECESSARY PROVISIONS INCLUDING DEFINITIONS INTO THE BODY OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

III

IN OUR EXAMINATION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT WE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL AREAS WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD RESULT IN A LACK OF CLARITY WHICH IN TURN WOULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED. UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, LAUNCHERS FOR CERTAIN BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE TO BE LIMITED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH LIMITS LAUNCHERS CAN BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD UNLESS THERE ARE PRECISE DEFINITIONS OF THE MISSILES FOR WHICH THE LAUNCHERS ARE CONFIGURED. FURTHER, AND RELATED TO THIS POINT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE CONVERSION OF LAUNCHERS FOR "LIGHT ICBMS" TO LAUNCHERS FOR "HEAVY ICBMS" WILL BE CARRIED OVER TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE CAN BE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE OBLIGATION BEING ASSUMED WITHOUT A MUTUALLY AGREED DEFINITION OF A "HEAVY ICBM". IN THIS CONNECTION, THE DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET ICBMS SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAVE BLURRED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "LIGHT AND "HEAVY" THAT EXISTED AT THAT TIME. THESE DEVELOPMENTS UNDERSCORE THE NEED TO INCLUDE, IN THE BODY OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, A PRECISE DEFINITION OF A "HEAVY ICBM".

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A SECOND POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY IN THE SOVIET DRAFT CONCERNS THE MATTER OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT AS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE IV OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THERE IS AN AGREED INTERPRETATION TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT SILO DIMENSIONS WILL NOT BE "SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED", AND A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TERM "SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED" MEANS "10-15 PERCENT OF THE PRESENT DIMENSIONS". THE SOVIET DRAFT DOES NOT ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO SIMPLY CARRY OVER THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING WOULD NOT RESOLVE ITS AMBIGUITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE "PRESENT DIMENSIONS" REFERRED TO ARE THE ORIGINAL DIMENSIONS OF THESE SILOS AND THAT IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE SIDES ARE IN AGREEMENT WOULD BE BEST SERVED IF ANY INCREASE IN THE ORIGINAL DIMENSIONS WERE LIMITED TO EITHER LENGTH OR DIAMETER. WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE SOVIET VIEW ON THIS POINT. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED AND THAT BOTH POINTS SHOULD BE CLEARLY SET FORTH IN A PROVISION IN THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ANOTHER POSSIBLE SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING ARISING OUT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT IS ITS FAILURE TO DEFINE A MIRV SYSTEM.  
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IN THIS CONNECTION, BOTH SIDES HAVE MISSILE SYSTEMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE (MRVS). THE AIDE MEMOIRE IS CLEAR THAT THE 1320 AGGREGATE LIMITATION APPLIES ONLY TO MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLE SYSTEMS WHICH ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE (MIRVS). THE US DRAFT PROVIDES A DEFINITION OF A MIRV SYSTEM WHICH DRAWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN MRV AND MIRV SYSTEMS, A DEFINITION THAT WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE BODY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THERE IS ALSO A LACK OF CLARITY IN THE SOVIET DRAFT IN THE MANNER IN WHICH IT ADDRESSES THE QUESTION OF WHEN IN THEIR LIFE CYCLE CERTAIN WEAPONS SYSTEMS WOULD INITIALLY BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATES. THE SOVIET DRAFT WOULD INCLUDE THOSE SYSTEMS "IN THE FINAL STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION". WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TERM REQUIRES CLARIFICATION TO INSURE THAT THERE IS A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING AS TO THE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATE LIMITATIONS. IN CONTRAST TO THE UNDEFINED TERM

"FINAL STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION" IN THE SOVIET DRAFT, THE US DRAFT CLEARLY SETS FORTH THE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHEN VARIOUS WEAPONS WILL INITIALLY BE INCLUDED IN THE AGGREGATES.

MY FINAL REFERENCE TODAY TO OUR EXAMINATION OF THE SOVIET DRAFT DEALS WITH ITS PROVISION CONCERNING THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. THE SOVIET DRAFT SIMPLY REFERS TO THE 1972 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ESTABLISHING THE SCC. THIS MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OUTLINES THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC. IT REFERS TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ABM TREATY, THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES WHICH TAKEN TOGETHER OUTLINE IN DETAIL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXISTING AGREEMENTS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT SIMPLE TO A CROSS-REFERENCE TO THE 1972 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING. FOR THIS REASON, THE US DRAFT SETS FORTH SPECIFIC PROVISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SCC SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE ABM TREATY AND ADDS NEW RESPONSIBILITIES REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE BROADER PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IV

MR. MINISTER, I HAVE PRESENTED THE REASONS WHY THE NEW  
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AGREEMENT SHOULD BE A CLEAR, PRECISE AND SELF-CONTAINED DOCUMENT. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS ON THE VIEWS I HAVE PRESENTED TODAY. I BELIEVE THAT THROUGH SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THE DELEGATIONS CAN BE GUIDED AS TO THE BEST WAY IN WHICH TO PROCEED TOWARD THE GOAL OF TRANSLATING THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING INTO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DRAFT TEXT. UNQUOTE  
JOHNSON

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